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ARGUMENT
I.
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS
THE "CORRECTION OF ERROR" STANDARD.
The most recent statement of Utah law on judicial review of agency determinations is In
the matter of Sam Oil Inc., 165 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (July 26, 1991). In Sam Oil a case which
also concerns the right to receive revenue from oil and gas wells, the Supreme Court found that
the issue to be reviewed "was not based upon any technical expertise of the agency," and
therefore, "[t]he question there was one that the court was as competent to decide as the
agency." Id. at 7. Likewise, the legal issues in this case concern a straightforward application
of various statutory provisions under Utah's Oil and Gas Conservation Act, requiring no
particular expertise or technical pronouncement. Under this standard, no deference need be
given to the Board's resolution. Id.
Respondents' briefs cite Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d
601, 610 (Utah 1983), in support of their position that the Utah Oil, Gas & Mining Board's
(hereinafter "Board") decision regarding Mr. Bennion is entitled to special deference. (See Brief
of Respondent Graham, p. 19; Brief of Respondent Board, p. 15). The Utah Supreme Court
found in this case that on issues of "special law," defined by the court as an agency's
interpretation of statutory law it is empowered to administer, its decision is subject to review
under the reasonableness and rationality standard. Id. at 610. As Mr. Bennion has noted, no
special expertise or complex valuation is needed to determine whether Bennion has a vested right
to proceeds absent a pooling order. Yet assuming, for the sake of argument, that Bennion's
Petition constituted an issue of "special law," Pub. Serv. Comm'n makes it plain that the
1

standard to be used by this Court regarding the application of law to the facts remains the
reasonableness and rationality standard.

n.
THE BOARD ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO DENY THE RELIEF
REQUESTED BY MR. BENNION.
A.

MR. BENNION IS ENTITLED TO THE PROCEEDS OF HIS VESTED
PROPERTY INTEREST.
Mr. Bennion is the vested owner of a certain unleased mineral interest in Section 20,

Township 3 South, Range 5 West, Duchesne County, Utah (R. 187). Bennion's right to his
share of the mineral interests are inherent from ownership, and are not contingent upon the
existence of a pooling agreement. In Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d
1135 (Utah 1983) (hereinafter "Bennion /"), the defendant Shell made a similar argument that
Section 40-6-6(g) (the equivalent of the present Section 40-6-6(7)(b)), granting a landowner's
royalty to the nonconsenting interest owner) applied only "to the contents of forced pooling
orders." Id. at 1141. In response, Justice Oaks stated that the royalty interest was "intended
to apply without regard to whether there has been a pooling order."

Id. at 1141-1142.

(Emphasis added). The Bennion I decision clearly found that the rights of an unleased mineral
interest owner are vested regardless of whether a pooling order exists.

"Bennion, as a

nonconsenting mineral owner, had a vested right to a royalty prior to payout and a vested right
to his statutory share (subject to payment of expenses) thereafter." Id. Mr. Bennion's vested
right to receive his interests derive from his position as an owner of property. As noted by the
court, "A vested right to some compensation is therefore essential to prevent the regulatory
legislation from unconstitutionally depriving the nonconsenting mineral owner of his property

2

without compensation. Id. at 1142. (Emphasis added). These vested rights are independent of
the existence of a pooling order.
In its Brief, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas & Mining (hereinafter "Board"), attempts to
distinguish Bennion I by stating that forced pooling was ordered in that case. (See Brief of
Board, p. 16). However, the central issue described in Bennion I concerned the nonconsenting
owners "vested right to a share of production prior to pooling." Id. at 1138. (Emphasis added).
The factual distinction of whether pooling has not been established, or will become effective at
a later date, is irrelevant to the central issue of what rights exist in absence of a pooling order.
This was the issue in Bennion /, and is the issue at hand. Prior to the resolution of Bennion /,
Shell, like Graham, argued "that Bennion had no rights to any payment so long as he was not
involved in any pooling arrangement." Bennion I, 675 P.2d at 1138. Respondents' briefs make
this same argument, that Bennion's rights do not vest until the time of pooling. (See Brief of
Graham, p. 13; Brief of Board, p. 15). This argument has been definitively rejected by Bennion
I, which established that a nonconsenting land owner has a vested right to a share in production
both before and after payout, regardless of a pooling order. Id. at 1142.
B.

BENNION'S VESTED INTEREST IS DETERMINABLE IN ABSENCE OF A
POOLING ORDER.
In its Brief, Graham has contended that Mr. Bennion's interest is impossible to determine

in the absence of a pooling order. (See Brief of Graham, p. 13). However, this argument is
nothing more than an attempt to distract the court from the actual facts as they exist in this case.
These facts show that Graham has provided Bennion with a series of payments representing
Bennion's interest in the wells operated by Graham as well as letters indicating Graham's intent
to pay Mr. Bennion his interest in the wells. (TR. 3. 50-51). The exhibits proffered at the
3

hearing by Mr. Bennion's counsel provide evidence of Graham's payment of proceeds from the
wells and its intent to continue payment.' As mentioned and specifically described in Mr.
Bennion's Brief, these documents were submitted to show that Mr. Bennion was receiving and
could expect to continue to receive various proceeds for the two wells both from Graham and
from other parties that had an interest. (See Brief of Bennion pp. 13-14; Bennion Ex. 16, 17,
TR. 3. 50-51, 54). The logical prerequisite to these payments was Graham's calculation of
Bennion's percentage interest in the unit. These facts show that Graham was not only capable
of determining Mr. Bennion's interest, but that it actually did so, and paid him in the absence
of pooling.
C.

THE BOARD IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO EXERCISE ITS STATUTORY
AUTHORITY TO GRANT MR. BENNION RELIEF UNDER SECTION 40-6-9.
The Respondents have both argued that Mr. Bennion should not be able to bring an action

to resolve his grievances before the Board because pooling was not in force. (See Brief of
Board, P. 16, Brief of Graham, p. 11). However, there is no provision in the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act that requires pooling before a petitioner may request relief. In addition,
Respondents' attempt to deny Mr. Bennion his right to petition the Board overlooks the fact that
Mr. Bennion's action has been brought as a result of the inability of Graham and Bennion to
arrive at an agreement regarding pooling. As indicated, Bennion made every effort, including
attempts to stipulate to voluntary pooling and proposed various orders, to arrive at a pooling
agreement. (R. 189; 19-27; TR. 2. 26). However, these efforts were rejected by Graham. The
Board ignored the fact that while Mr. Bennion made every effort to achieve an agreement or

1

These exhibits were rejected by the Board. The Board's error in refusing to admit these
exhibits will be discussed below.
4

order, he alone could not accomplish pooling. Consent on the part of Graham, or Board action,
was also necessary.
Following this failure of all attempts at voluntary pooling, the Board should have ordered
pooling under its own authority.

At the hearing between Graham and Bennion, Bennion's

counsel suggested that the Board take this action. (TR. 3. 64-66). Pursuant to Section 40-6-9,
the Board is explicitly authorized to resolve disputes over the amount of proceeds to which a
mineral interest owner is entitled.

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1991).

Given this

authority, it would have been entirely proper for the Board to resolve the pooling issue in the
course of the Bennion proceeding. Instead, the Board granted summary judgment on the very
ground that pooling had not been accomplished, when this pooling should have been ordered by
the Board.
By its own admission, the Board had the authority to order forced pooling. (TR. 3. 73).
The reason for the Board's failure to take this action during the course of the proceedings is not
clear. Bennion has previously addressed the fact that there is no logic to support Chairman
Carter's justification based on taxpayer cost. (See Brief of Bennion, p. 8; TR. 3. 73). As also
mentioned, substantial attempts to arrive at a voluntary pooling agreement between Mr. Bennion
and Graham have failed. Given such a situation, a party whose action is dismissed on summary
judgment for failure to have a pooling order must conceivably be forced to bring a second
petition repeating the entire process in an attempt to get a forced pooling order. As previously
indicated by Bennion, the Board had all the necessary authority to accomplish pooling during
the course of the proceedings.

Instead, the Board's decision to dismiss Bennion's petition

5

unjustly and unduly prolonged any adjudication, denying Bennion his right to effectively petition
the Board as established in Section 40-6-9.
One of the enumerated public interests expressly described by the Board in Section 40-6-1
is the protection of "the correlative rights of all owners. . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 (1988).
Under the definitional section, correlative rights are defined to mean "the opportunity of each
owner in a pool to produce his just and equitable share of the oil and gas in the pool without
waste." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2 (Supp. 1991). Bennion's rights to his proceeds clearly fit
this definition.

As previously indicated by Bennion, the Board's actions belied its statutory

purposes in failing to protect or even consider Mr. Bennion's interests resulting in a hearing that
completely failed to constitute responsible adjudication. Bennion has been prejudiced as a result
of this dismissal of his Petition because Mr. Bennion has not received proceeds for which he has
a vested right, and continues to be prejudiced because he is presently still not receiving these
proceeds.
Respondent Board's Brief makes a vague argument to the effect that Mr. Bennion has
requested some type of unusual relief in the form of an "equitable pooling." (See Brief of
Board, p. 17).

As support for this theory, the Board relies on the Williams and Meyers

Treatise, Oil & Gas Law. The applicability of the term "equitable pooling" to the facts of this
appeal are unclear. Williams and Meyers uses the term "equitable pooling" to describe pooling
not contemplated by the parties nor provided for by statute. See 6 H. Williams and C. Meyers,
Oil & Gas Law, § 906 (1985). On the other hand, Section 905 of this same treatise describes
statutory compulsory pooling provisions enacted by states, including Utah.

Williams and

Meyers, § 905. Where compulsory pooling has been provided by statute, equitable pooling is

6

unnecessary. In response to the Board's argument in its brief that the relief requested is separate
from the remedy afforded by statute, Bennion states that he requests a remedy of pooling plainly
provided in the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9. (See Brief of Board, p. 17).
In making its decision to grant Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Board erred
in failing to provide Mr. Bennion the type of relief which the Board was created to provide.
As a result, the Board's decision to grant the Summary Judgment Motion was in error and must
be reversed.
IIL
THE BOARD ERRED IN EXCLUDING BENNION'S PROFFERED EVIDENCE,
The Board's exclusion of the exhibits offered into evidence by Mr. Bennion's counsel
was burdensome and unjust to Bennion. In their briefs, both Graham and the Board argue that
Summary Judgment was properly granted because no evidence was offered to rebut Graham's
Summary Judgment Motion. (See Brief ofBoard, p. 12; Brief of Graham, p. 15). However,
as shown previously by Bennion in his Brief, many of the refused exhibits directly concerned
evidence to rebut a Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Bennion Ex. 9-14, 16 & 17). These
exhibits are relevant to show the existence of an issue of fact regarding whether Mr. Bennion's
interest could be determined in the absence of a pooling order. These exhibits clearly show that
Bennion's interest could be, and actually was, determined in the absence of pooling. These
exhibits are also directly relevant to show that Graham's previous conduct in paying and
manifesting an intent to continue to pay Bennion's interest without the existence of a pooling
order was a waiver of the jurisdictional issue concerning pooling. As was pointed out by Mr.
Bennion's counsel at the hearing and in his Brief, jurisdictional defects can be waived by the
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conduct of the parties. (TR. 3. 52-53). Graham's previous conduct, as shown by Bennion's
exhibits, were relevant to support the preclusion of a Motion for Summary Judgment on the
grounds of jurisdictional waiver and the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
The Board has argued that these exhibits were properly excluded as untimely. {See Brief
of Board, p. 19). However, the provision relied upon by the Board should not apply to these
exhibits.

Bennion's counsel offered these exhibits at the hearing in response to Graham's

Summary Judgment Motion. Under Rule 619-105-500, exhibits offered for such purpose may
be brought at the time of trial

Utah Admin. R. 619-105-500. As a result, there was no just

reason for the exclusion of this evidence.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the Board's rules required the filing of
these exhibits prior to trial, exclusion of this evidence was still in error because this requirement
is unjust and burdensome to petitioners before the Board. According to the rule argued by the
Board, Bennion would have been forced to file all exhibits far in advance of the hearing. This
rule is not only unduly burdensome on all petitioners before the Board, but it is also much more
strict than any requirement set forth by the State or Federal Courts.2 For example, the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure state that at trial, H[a]ll evidence shall be admitted which is admissible
under the Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court." Rule 43, Utah
R. Civ. P.

Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows the admission of all relevant

2

The practice in Utah, for both State and Federal courts, is to control pretrial discovery of
exhibits by pretrial orders, which, in counsel's experience, almost uniformly allow the parties
to exchange trial exhibits as late as five to seven days before trial, even though there may have
been some earlier disclosure of the trial exhibits. The underlying reason for this kind of pretrial
disclosure is the recognition of the practical problem that all litigants face: it is usually
impossible to have all exhibits completely predetermined prior to trial.
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evidence at trial.3 The Federal Courts also allow the admission of any and all evidence properly
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, without requiring the submission of all exhibits
in advance of trial. (See Advisory Committee notes on 1972 amendment to Rule 43, Fed. R.
Civ. P.; and Rule 402, Fed. R. Evid.)
The Board's establishment of a requirement which is more stringent than the wellestablished and reasoned rules of the State and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of
Evidence provides just cause to question this rule.

Yet, in addition, the participants in

administrative proceedings should be allowed more procedural leeway than is permitted in State
and Federal Courts. "Administrative proceedings are usually conducted with greater flexibility
and informality than judicial proceedings. . . . Rigid adherence to judicial procedures in
administrative proceedings is generally inappropriate because it ignores basic differences between
judicial and administrative procedures." Pitcher v. State Dept. of Social Serv., 663 P.2d 450,
453 (Utah 1983). In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has previously noted that administrative
hearings are much more liberal than trials in the methods parties can use to prove their claims.
"'Proof may depart from pleadings and pleadings may be amended to conform to proof if undue
surprise is avoided.'"

Pilcher, 663 P.2d at 453, quoting 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law

Treatise, § 14.11 at 47. Contrary to the method of operating suggested by Pilcher, the Board
has established a rule which goes beyond even "rigid adherence to judicial procedures," Id. at
453, by denying Petitioners to the Board the ability to submit exhibits to support their Petitions
unless such exhibits are submitted far in advance of trial.

3

The Board did not dispute the relevance of these exhibits to the issues in Mr. Bennion's
Petition. As mentioned, Bennion's exhibits were also relevant to the issue of whether summary
judgment should be granted.
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Respondent Board has argued that this evidence should not be admitted because some of
the rejected exhibits were received by the Court in Graham's Memorandum. (See Brief of
Board, p. 21). The Respondents do not, however, suggest that all of the proffered evidence was
previously admitted, or that any of Graham's evidence concerned the payments made to Bennion.
The admission of evidence in Graham's Memorandum, therefore, did not change the fact that
the exclusion of Bennion's exhibits denied him the opportunity to argue his opposition to
Summary Judgment. Yet the Board's argument raises the question of what harm could possibly
have resulted from the admission of Bennion's exhibits. Portions of the exhibits offered at the
hearing were contained in Graham's Memorandum. All of the offered documents were matters
of public record, either from Graham or from the Division. (TR. 3. 43-46). As a result, there
would have been no undue surprise or unfairness to Graham in the admission of this evidence.
Therefore, there was no just reason for excluding Bennion's exhibits.
Despite this clear error, the Board argues that its decision to exclude these exhibits is
entitled to some special deference in recognition of its expertise in the area of Oil and Gas law.
(See Brief of Board, pp. 21-22). Even assuming any reason existed for the Court to grant
deference to the decisions of the Board in other areas, which it does not, there is absolutely no
cause for the Court to grant deference to the Board on evidentiary matters. Deference should
only be granted when the Administrative Agency has greater deference than the Court. See Sam
Oil, 165 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7.

Any assertion that the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining has

knowledge of the admissability and relevance of evidence even equal to, much less superior
than, the Utah Supreme Court is groundless.

10

CONCLUSION
The Board holds all the necessary authority to grant Mr. Bennion the relief requested by
him in his Petition to the Board.

As the owner of certain unleased mineral interests, Mr.

Bennion has a vested right to receive has interests in the wells' production regardless of the
existence of a pooling order. Despite this fact, the Board refused to recognize Bennion's rights
or to determine Mr. Bennion's proceeds as mandated under Section 40-6-9. Under the Act, the
Board has the authority to order pooling, and was empowered to promptly resolve the entire
dispute. The Board instead acted in a manner inconsistent with the stated purposes of the Board
and Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, § 40-6-1 et seq., unnecessarily delaying the adjudication
of Bennion's claims. The failure to grant Bennion his entitled relief constituted irresponsible
adjudication on the part of the Board.
A further indication of the Board's failure to responsibly adjudicate Bennion's claims is
shown by its cursory granting of Graham's Summary Judgment Motion without even considering
Bennion's offered exhibits. These exhibits, many of which were relevant to show Graham's
waiver of the right to insist on pooling, and the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the necessity of pooling, were unjustly excluded.

This exclusion, made in

contravention of all established judicial practice, resulted in undue prejudice to Bennion, who
was therefore unable to bring evidence to controvert summary judgment.

This erroneous

conduct of the Board denied Bennion his opportunity to receive his entitled relief, as provided
by Section 40-6-9.
The Board's disposition of Bennion's Petition was made in error. Petitioner therefore
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Board's decision, and order the Board to grant
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Mr. Bennion his entitled relief. Petitioner specifically requests the Court to hear Mr. Bennion's
evidence, determine precisely what is owed to Mr. Bennion, and order Graham to provide
Bennion with an accounting of his share of the proceeds from the two wells.
DATED this

/

day of October, 1991.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

PETER STIRBA
BENSON L. HATHAWAYT JR.
Attorneys for Sam H. Bennion
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